16th JULY 2009
Rifleman Aminiasi Toge
2nd Battalion The Rifles
Rifleman Aminiasi 'Togey' Toge was born in Suva, Fiji, with his twin brother on 19 July 1982.
He swapped the southern Pacific paradise of home for the Infantry Training Centre in Catterick, North Yorkshire in September 2007 and passed out as a Rifleman in April 2008. Posted to the 2nd Battalion, The Rifles based in Ballykinler, County Down, Rifleman Toge soon deployed to Kosovo before returning to the UK and starting pre-deployment training for Afghanistan.
Rifleman Toge was a keen swimmer and an outstanding rugby player who could open gaps in a defence with the deftest of steps before accelerating through with his extraordinary pace. He also loved to travel.
Rifleman Toge was thriving in the demanding conditions of an Afghan summer and hoped to attempt the Junior Non-Commissioned Officers cadre on returning to Ballykinler.
Along with his twin brother, Loame, Rifleman Toge leaves behind three sisters and his devoted parents. His whole family are very firmly front and centre of the prayers of every single soldier in 2 Rifles.
Lieutenant Colonel Rob Thomson MBE, Commanding Officer 2 Rifles Battle Group, said:
"Rifleman Toge was my fastest Fijian and was known as 'Lightning'. He was smaller than most of my South Pacific heroes but no less robust, determined and wily with an oval ball under his arm. And that was when he was at his happiest - on our (usually wet) pitch in Northern Ireland or throwing the ball around his FOB in the dust.
"He was one of 35 heroic Fijians in this Battalion who add huge value, character and noise to all my companies across Helmand.
"Rifleman Toge was one of the toughest Riflemen under my command and he was adored - heart-breakingly so - by all who had the privilege to encounter him. He made such light work of the heavy General Purpose Machine Gun - it was like a pistol in his hands.
"He had that uniquely infectious Fijian laugh and was a godly man who knew in whom he placed his trust. We have lost a courageous man of great stature - there was no truer moral compass in the Battle Group but there was mischief too, all very appropriate and full of fun. Rifleman Toge will be sorely missed and our first thoughts are with his family at this unimaginably difficult time.
"Across the Upper Sangin Valley, small gangs of brave Fijian Riflemen sang a poignant hymn as we gathered to remember what Rifleman Toge meant to all of us and bade him farewell. When the Bugle Major sounded the Advance tonight, we knew the call to arms would have been heard in Suva. Mothe….vinaka vaka levu."
Major Sam Plant, Officer Commanding C Squadron Group Light Dragoons, said:
"I had not known Rifleman Toge for very long – his Platoon came under my command just three weeks prior to his untimely death. Notwithstanding that, he certainly made an impression.
"A big, strong man who was very much a key player within his Platoon, Rifleman Toge was comfortable on patrol with his GPMG [General Purpose Machine Gun] in hand. He was a determined and skilful soldier who clearly enjoyed the trust and affection of his fellow men.
"He had that uniquely infectious Fijian laugh and was a godly man who knew in whom he placed his trust. We have lost a courageous man of great stature - there was no truer moral compass in the Battle Group."
Lieutenant Colonel Rob Thomson MBE, Commanding Officer 2 Rifles Battle Group
"Of particular note was his infectious smile and his positive attitude to life. This approach inspired those around him and he was ever present whenever a comrade needed help. He was an all round inspiration.
"Forward Operating Base Keenan has lost a great man and a true team player. He will be hugely missed by his many friends and colleagues. We are thinking and praying for his family at this terrible time."
Captain Andy Huxter, 11 Platoon Commander, 2 Rifles, said:
"Rifleman Toge was a pleasure to command. He had no problems in life and faced everything, including the cold - which he hated - with the broadest and brightest of smiles.
"He came to my Platoon in October 2008 from the Machine Gun Platoon, and has been at home in the dust and stifling heat of Afghanistan from the day he arrived.
"He was fitter, stronger and more robust than most. He would step so lightly on patrol, belying the weight he was carrying, setting an example to all of us.
"When asked by a fellow Rifleman why he went to the gym twice a day, he responded that it was so if anyone else got injured, he could carry them to safety.
"He was killed carrying his General Purpose Machine Gun, the job he enjoyed most. My lasting memories will be of him running around in the FOB (Forward Operating Base) in the heat of an Afghan summer trying to warm up because it was too cold in the FOB 'pool'.
"He was softly spoken, unassuming and utterly reliable. His presence made people laugh and be happy - his good cheer was infectious.
"Rifleman Toge was a gentle man, he will be sorely missed and 11 Platoon will not be the same without him. My thoughts and prayers are with his family for whom he cared very much. Rfn Toge, I know, is in a far better place now."
Corporal Llweyelyn Bryan, Section Commander, said:
"Rifleman Toge, or 'Togey' as he was fondly known, was a larger than life character who was forever lifting the spirits of his mates.
"Whenever his name was called, an almighty grin would appear on his face, swiftly followed by a mischievous giggle.
"Rifleman Toge was a Section Commander's dream; he rarely had to be told to do anything. He was a natural infantryman who was very proficient and professional. He was also very robust and fit.
"It will come as no surprise that he was the natural GPMG candidate. It will remain firmly etched in my mind whilst on patrol in the middle of the heat of the day, with sweat pouring down his face, he would look back at me and give me one of his monstrous grins, immediately followed by his unique giggle.
"I was very fortunate to have such a remarkable Rifleman covering my back and that of the rest of the section. Rfn Toge was a much loved member of the platoon and his constant humming and singing will be sorely missed.
"All our thoughts are with his family and friends in this very sad moment in time. Rest in peace my big Fijian friend."
Rifleman Peter White, fellow Rifleman, said:
"Rifleman Toge was the easiest bloke to make friends with and, when I was told that we would be in the same platoon, I was really pleased.
"For three months we had neighbouring bedspaces and spent time in the sangars where he would tell me all about his home, his family and his faith in God.
"I learnt a lot about him as a person and his family. I know that he loved his sisters dearly and he talked about home so much that I want to go to Fiji.
" 'Togey' was always smiling and always had morale, but most of all he never complained, not even about his difficult job which he did as capably and with more enthusiasm than anyone.
"Everyone in 11 Platoon is going to miss his giggling and soft voice. My thoughts and prayers are with his mother, sisters, brother and his father whom he talked about so much and loved so very much. Take care, Togey, miss you mate."
Rifleman Kyle Kalakoda, fellow Rifleman, said:
"Rifleman Toge was a shy guy whom I met when I first came to the Battalion. He showed me the ins and outs, even though he had not been in the Army that long himself.
"To me he was like the big brother I never had, his advice would range from soldiering to day to day living of life.
"He was a tremendous person with a big, big heart and he will be sorely missed by me, the lads and even my girlfriend whom he knew really well.
"Rest in peace my friend, your smile and humour will never be forgotten."
Rifleman Wilhelm Louw, fellow Rifleman, said:
"Rifleman Toge, you were my Christian friend and all I can say is thanks to God for the privilege of knowing you these past five months.
"There is only one verse I can read today, the one you showed me: For I consider the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is going to be revealed to us. Romans 8:18.
"I know you are sitting in the presence of God and one day I will see you up there my friend. Thanks for everything and my prayers are with you and your family."
Rifleman Robert Gatward, fellow Rifleman, said:
"Our hearts have swollen with your loss. Without you here to sing and laugh with your mates, we will never be the same. March to heaven and help guide us through these dark times. Never forget us as we shall never forget you."
Rifleman Sovita Turagabeci and Rifleman Jotame Tagicakibau, Fijian brothers and fellow Riflemen, said:
"Rifleman Aminiasi Toge was a true Christian by his belief and his actions. He loved to help people and was like an older brother to Fijians joining the Battalion, ready to put an arm around them and give them advice.
"He loved socialising and was friendly to everyone. He was always laughing and making the people around him laugh.
"He loved his job and of course he loved rugby, which he played fast and hard. We are certain that his family will miss him very much, especially this Christmas when he was due to go back to Fiji to spend it with them.
"Rifleman Toge will also be missed by many people in the Battalion, every Fijian amongst them, including us.
"We called each other Naita, a Fijian greeting showing respect and friendship for each other and for Rifleman Toge's home province Kadavu and ours Lomaiviti. Aminiasi, you were a hero, see you in heaven. Moce mada Naita"
5th JULY 2009
Lance Corporal Dane Elson
1st Battalion Welsh Guards
Lance Corporal Elson was born on 28 September 1986 in Harare, Zimbabwe. His family now lives in Bridgend in Wales. Having joined the Army, he completed his training in Guards Training Company, Catterick, in 2004 and joined the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards when they were based at RAF St Athan, near Cardiff.
He served in Iraq in 2004/05, and in Bosnia in 2006/07. He passed a promotion course and was promoted to Lance Corporal during the pre-deployment training for Afghanistan.
Lance Corporal Elson was a keen rugby player and he lived for the mates he had around him in the Welsh Guards. He had a very bright future ahead of him, and stood out as a Guardsman destined for the higher ranks of the battalion.
Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair, Commanding Officer, The Light Dragoons Battle Group, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was part of a small band of Welsh Guards attached to the Battle Group. Despite being small in number, they have made a huge impact with their professionalism, drive and determination to take the fight to the enemy. Lance Corporal Elson was one of the best of these. It is typical of the man that he died while providing cover to the rest of his platoon. Though Lance Corporal Elson is no longer with us, his fellow Welsh Guardsmen, and the Battle Group, will remember this talented and popular soldier."
His Battalion Second-in-Command, Major Andrew Speed MBE, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was a dedicated and loyal Welsh Guardsman who had been with the battalion for five years. He was promoted shortly before his deployment to Afghanistan and was looking forward to an undoubtedly bright future.
"Lance Corporal Elson was a Javelin operator with one of the fire support groups, a job he relished. He was extremely fit and was mentally very tough. Prior to deployment, Lance Corporal Elson broke his wrist while learning to drive a quad bike. This meant that his deployment would be delayed. So keen was he to deploy with his fellow Welsh Guardsmen that he suggested to his Section Commander that he should cut off his plaster and pretend that his wrist was fine. To his disappointment, he was forced to wait for his wrist to heal.
"With Lance Corporal Elson's belated deployment came his characteristic energy and enthusiasm, which made an immediate impact on his friends and fellow Welsh Guardsmen serving in the small contingent of Guardsmen attached to The Light Dragoons. He was soon in his element, and could not have been a more effective Team Commander on operations - he galvanised his team and was the fully rounded article. It was so typical of Lance Corporal Elson to have been providing cover and looking out for his mates when he died, he lived his life with a very selfless ethos which inspired others.
"Outside of the Army he was a man whose company others would seek. His friends describe him as being as sociable as a young Guardsman can be; he was universally regarded as being reliably good for morale. For Lance Corporal Elson's friends, no night out was complete without his presence.
"In the same manner that we have dealt with our previous tragic losses, the Welsh Guards will bear this loss with fortitude and determination. In the knowledge that our fallen will have wanted nothing more than for us to continue with even greater determination and stoicism, we will continue undaunted by our losses."
His Company Commander from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, Major Austen Salusbury, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was a first class soldier who crammed a lot into the five years he spent with 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. He had shone as a Guardsman and had been recently promoted before deploying to Afghanistan, a deployment he relished and which caused him to be so disappointed when he could not deploy at the same time as the rest of his Fire Support Group due to an injury.
"When he did deploy, he proved as expected to be a very strong Team Commander in the demanding operational environment of Afghanistan. His belated deployment from the UK brought significant impact; his characteristic drive and determination were an example to his comrades in the small and tightly-knit band of Guardsmen serving with The Light Dragoons Battle Group.
"Lance Corporal Elson's unassuming character belied a quiet determination and confidence which was reassuring to all. With a diligence in all that he did, his Platoon Commander could not have asked for a better man to command one of his fire support group teams.
"Extremely sociable and universally popular, his loss will be felt by all of the friends he had in the Anti-Tank Platoon and his Fire Support Group, in Support Company as a whole, and by the wider Welsh Guards family."
His Platoon Commander, Captain Phil Durham, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was recently promoted because he embodied all the qualities of the most promising of junior leaders: outstanding fitness, calmness under pressure and an intense reliability. He was immensely popular and had a great sense of humour. No matter the size of the task ahead of him, he would take it in his stride with the same wry grin. All this made him an outstanding Welsh Guardsman and Junior Non-Commissioned Officer. His passing has left a void in the platoon which cannot be filled."
Sergeant Grant Lewis, his Platoon Sergeant, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was an awesome leader. He was always first to volunteer, no matter what the job. He loved soldiering and was a constant inspiration to those around him. Our platoon was attached to B Company, 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment, and he was immediately a highly respected and well-liked member of the Company Group."
Lance Sergeant Dan Collins, another member of the platoon, said:
"Lance Corporal Elson was a true friend and comrade. He always had a smile on his face. He was a cracking soldier and will not be forgotten."
Secretary of State for Defence, Bob Ainsworth MP, said:
"I was very saddened to learn of the death of Lance Corporal Dane Elson, who had served bravely in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia, and clearly had a bright future and successful Army career ahead of him. The respect and warmth with which his friends, colleagues and commanders remember him speaks for itself. All of our thoughts are with his grieving family."
4th JULY 2009
Lance Corporal David Dennis
The Light Dragoons
Lance Corporal David 'Duke' Dennis was serving with The Light Dragoons Battle Group, which had begun a clearance operation the previous day, at the time of his death. He had deployed as part of The Light Dragoons' Command Troop and was responsible for ensuring radio communications for the Commanding Officer's tactical headquarters, both on foot and on vehicles.
Having just helped to secure a helicopter landing site for the extraction of casualties from an earlier incident, Lance Corporal Dennis was amongst a group hit by an improvised explosive device, and sustained fatal injuries.
Lance Corporal Dennis was born on 16 May 1980. He joined the Army on 14 February 2003 as a gunner in the Royal Artillery before joining The King's Troop. Having served with the Gunners for just over two years, he was attached to The Light Dragoons for a six-month tour of Iraq in 2005. Having struck up strong friendships over the six months, he applied to transfer and joined the regiment in February 2006. Lance Corporal Dennis was on his second tour of Afghanistan. He leaves behind his mother Adele, of Llanelli, as well as his twin brother Gareth and his fiancée Lisa.
Lance Corporal Dennis was a quietly spoken and popular soldier; fiercely loyal to his friends. He was known throughout the regiment simply as 'Duke' - a nickname of which he was hugely proud. He believed wholeheartedly in what he was doing and would always back himself to the hilt.
Lance Corporal Dennis loved the banter that typifies Army life, and he could give as good as he got, though he had the character to laugh at himself as well. He loved the gym, and would jokingly show off his muscles at any opportunity. He took great pride in mentoring and looking after the junior members of his troop, and he would be one of the first they would turn to for advice and guidance.
Ambitious and determined, Lance Corporal Dennis wanted to pursue the dismounted side of Formation Reconnaissance, and had volunteered to attend Junior Brecon on his return and wanted to serve in the Brigade Reconnaissance Force in the future.
Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair DSO, Commanding Officer, The Light Dragoons Battle Group, said:
"Lance Corporal Dennis was one of a hugely talented generation of Light Dragoons. With tours of Afghanistan and Iraq behind him, he was experienced beyond his relatively junior years. Duke loved being in the regiment, and the regiment celebrated this popular, genuine and heartfelt soldier.
"If there is any consolation it is that he is reunited with his close friend Lance Corporal Nigel Moffett, whose death earlier in the tour had affected Lance Corporal Dennis greatly. My sincerest condolences go out to his mother Adele, his brother Gareth and his fiancée Lisa. We will remember Lance Corporal Dennis; we will be worthy of his memory; we will continue to take the fight to the enemy that has taken him from us."
Major Rupert Lyon Army Air Corps, Officer Commanding D Squadron Light Dragoons, said:
"Duke was a quietly spoken Welshman who had no problems being the only Welshman in a regiment that recruits from the North East. It was a characteristic that immediately stood him out from his peers and ensured he got the recognition that he deserved.
"He was well known throughout the regiment and was a great asset to have on your side during squadron rugby matches, where he was unstoppable. He was a very capable small arms instructor, and was vital to making sure that the squadron was properly trained for deployment.
"During quiet periods he could often be found in the armoury checking that the squadron weapons were serviceable or otherwise in the gym improving on his already fearsome strength. Our thoughts go to his family and his fiancée Lisa, who he intended to marry on his return from Afghanistan. Duke will be surely missed by all of the regiment but will never be forgotten."
Captain David Ansell, the Regimental Signals Officer, said:
"Duke was a dedicated soldier and an absolute rock, who could be depended on no matter the circumstances. Nothing was ever too much trouble for him, whether it be at work or for his friends. He was an example to us all.
"Duke was a true Light Dragoon and personified everything that the regiment holds dear. He was utterly professional in all he did. He remained flexible and adaptable to whatever came his way, being equally at home in the turret of a CVR(T) [Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)], top gunning on a Mastiff or in the dismounted role. More than this though, he approached all he did with a desire to succeed. He was an excellent Junior NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] who was always looking after the needs of others first. His loss is a huge blow to the troop.
"One of life's real characters, he was fiercely proud of his Welsh roots. He was gregarious by nature, and always to be found in the thick of things. Duke's sense of humour and his mischievous streak were well known to all. Whilst losing Duke has had a profound effect on his friends and colleagues alike, it is as nothing to the pain his family and friends will be feeling back home. My thoughts and prayers are with them all at this most dreadful of times."
Corporal Tony Duncan, on behalf of his friends from Command Troop, said:
"Duke was one of the most loved guys in the regiment, and a character that will never be replaced. He will be remembered by his friends as being totally devoted and utterly professional. He loved being a skill at arms instructor, and never stopped reminding us that he was one of the best there was.
"There was more to him than just soldiering though. We will remember him for looking like Freddie Mercury when he grew a moustache and his dodgy dress sense on nights out. No matter how outrageous the outfit, the Duke was always certain that he was the coolest guy out that night.
"Duke was a man that every soldier should aspire to be. He had it all. He was quick-thinking, hard-working, strong, selfless, courageous, and had a great sense of humour. Most of all he was well respected and loyal to all those around him. Our friend Duke will never be forgotten."
Private Mike Devine, Adjutant General's Corps, said
"Duke was one of the good guys in life who you could trust implicitly. I had the privilege to call him my friend ever since we first met in King's Troop RHA [Royal Horse Artillery]. He was a warm and caring man with a large heart who would go out of his way to help anybody who asked.
"With his great sense of humour he was a joy to be around and could brighten up the dullest of days. He loved his job in The Light Dragoons and it was a pleasure to have served with him again. Rest in peace - I'll miss you."
Private Robert Laws
2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment
Private Robert Laws, aged 18, joined 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters) [2 MERCIAN] during Op HERRICK 10. His basic training started at the Army Foundation College, Harrogate, which prepares young men for the rigours of the Infantry Training Centre in Catterick. After completing the Combat Infantryman's Course in March of this year he passed off the square at Catterick and deployed to Helmand province to join B Company.
Known to friends as Robbie, Private Laws was killed alongside his mates in B Company while they were operating under command of The Light Dragoons Battle Group during Operation PANCHAI PALANG.
Private Laws, from Bromsgrove in Worcestershire, was a popular member of his platoon during training and achieved 'Best Shot' on the Light Machine Gun. When Robbie arrived at 2 MERCIAN he quickly became known for his mischievous sense of humour and a cheeky wit which endeared him well to his Platoon Sergeant.
To undertake basic training and be on the front line in Afghanistan within a year is a tremendous undertaking, especially for someone who is 18 years old. Private Laws rose to this challenge by embracing all the best qualities of being a soldier: ability to adapt and learn; strength of character; and determination.
Lieutenant Colonel Simon Banton, Commanding Officer of 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters), said:
“Robbie only joined 2 MERCIAN (Worcesters and Foresters) a very short time ago but had already begun to make his mark. He was excited and eager to deploy to Afghanistan and this only a few days after his 18th birthday.
"He was a warm and cheerful young man who mucked in when there was work to be done and quickly made friends. Robbie's falling has taken a good soldier from us; a man who was not afraid to move forward, endure hardship, and he had the courage to fight the enemy alongside his brothers.
"Robbie died alongside his mates in B Company, 2 MERCIAN, and his death has rocked them - they will hold him in their hearts as they fight on. The entire regiment's prayers are with Robbie's family who are devastated by his loss."
Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair, Commanding Officer, The Light Dragoons Battle Group, said:
"Private Laws had only been in the Battle Group a short time, but had already made an impression on his company as a bright, keen and enthusiastic soldier. He died going forward, taking the fight to the enemy and helping to free the local population from the tyranny of the insurgents. His loss is felt deeply through the whole Battle Group, and we will ensure that he is not forgotten."
Sergeant Major Paul Muckle, the B Company Sergeant Major, said:
"Private Robbie Laws joined B Company on the front line south of Garmsir, a town in Helmand province. From the outset he settled well into the platoon and became known for his mischievous sense of humour. Robbie showed great potential during his short time with B Company. My thoughts go out to his family and friends at this very sad and difficult time."
Major Richard Johnson, Officer Commanding Anzio Company, Infantry Training Centre Catterick, said:
"Private Laws developed noticeably throughout his time with Anzio Company. Although initially of a quiet nature he became popular and influential with his platoon as his ability developed. Excelling in shooting for a soldier of a slight build, he was commended for achieving the award of 'Best Shot' on the Light Machine Gun.
"Robbie used to make the section laugh; whether it was him sleeping all the time, his giddy sense of humour or his random taste in music."
Private Daniel Eaglesfield, fellow MERCIAN soldier from battalion and recruit training, said:
"Private Robert 'Robbie' Laws and I both joined the 2 MERCIAN after completing training at Army Training Regiment, Harrogate, and the Infantry Training Centre, Catterick. We deployed on Op HERRICK 10 on 11th May both not knowing quite what to expect. Robbie enjoyed his snooker and swimming.
"We used to talk a lot about our girlfriends back at home and how much we loved them; he was planning to take his girlfriend to Paris when the tour was over.
"Robbie was like a brother to me and we always looked out for each other, we shared many stories and laughter together. I will never forget the smile he always had on his face. Robbie, you were a pleasure to train and work alongside and I am proud to say you were my friend. My heart goes out to your family, friends and that beautiful girlfriend of yours. May you rest in peace Robert Laws."
Private Jacob Cherry, fellow MERCIAN soldier and friend from training, said:
"I first met Robbie when we were both at Army Foundation College, Harrogate. Our friendship grew even closer when we found out we were going to the same regiment and then the same battalion.
"Robbie was a great person to be around and certainly one of a kind. As we progressed through training we ended up in the same section and the same room. In the ten weeks we spent together there was some easy times and some hard times, but we overcame them. Robbie used to make the section laugh; whether it was him sleeping all the time, his giddy sense of humour or his random taste in music.
"As our time finished at Catterick we moved on to join the battalion. Robert and I, together with another close friend Daniel, bonded as three in a huge way. We had some fun times and we were good mates and he will be deeply missed. I send my deepest sympathies to his family and friends at home. I am very sorry."
Trooper Curtis Clifton, a childhood friend serving with The Light Dragoons, said:
"I remember when Robbie was seven years old. He was stood in the school playground by himself, a small shy lad reading a book. We became very good friends. We did everything together. We decided to join our local swimming team at the age of 13 and from then on you could see that he was a talented swimmer.
"At the age of 16 we both went to the Army Foundation Centre in Harrogate and went on a trip to Malta with the army swimming team. My best memory of him has to be when we both brought Hallowe'en masks and went around Sliema in Malta asking people for pictures with them. Robbie was a true friend. He would always put his family and friends before himself even if that meant him going without or getting himself into trouble."
1st JULY 2009
Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe
1st Battalion Welsh Guards
Rupert was the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, which is currently working as Battle Group Centre South in Helmand Province. The Battle Group was responsible for improving the security situation in the Provincial Capital, Lashkar Gah, and the surrounding areas - a formidable area of responsibility, containing about half the province's population. As a mark of the challenge faced, the number of soldiers in the Battle Group he was commanding had grown to well over 1000.
Rupert was commissioned into the Welsh Guards in 1992. At Regimental Duty he served as a Platoon Commander and Company Second-in-Command both in the UK and on Operations in Northern Ireland, as Adjutant in London, and as a Company Commander, again in the UK and on Operations in Northern Ireland. Extra Regimentally he has spent a year as an Intelligence Liaison Officer with the RUC Special Branch (in South Armagh); a year as an Intelligence Analyst at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (Northwood); two years as the Operations Officer of 1st (UK) Armoured Division (in Germany and Iraq); and two years in the MOD as Military Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy) and, latterly, Military Assistant to the Secretary of State for Defence. He assumed command of the 1st Battalion on 28th October 2008. He was a very keen polo player until the age of 28. Since then his primary interests have been sailing and game shooting.
Rupert leaves behind his wife, Sally, and their daughters Hannah and Sophie. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family at this very difficult time.
Brigadier Tim Radford, Commander Task Force Helmand, said,
"Rupert Thorneloe was, quite simply, a superb Commanding Officer. He was an inspiration to his men, and they loved him for it. He cared deeply for them and the whole Welsh Guards family. He died as he lived his life, leading from the front. As his Brigade Commander, I valued his leadership, his honesty and his enormous moral and physical courage. He was destined for greatness in the Army. As a friend for 12 years, I will remember him as a devoted husband to Sally and a most wonderful father to Hannah and Sophie. I shall miss him dreadfully."
Colonel Sandy Malcolm, Regimental Lieutenant Colonel Welsh Guards writes:
"Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe was an outstanding man and an officer destined for the top and the Regiment has lost one of their very finest. He cared passionately for the men under his command and what his Battalion were doing in Afghanistan.
"He had all the qualities that made him special. He was the consummate professional, charismatic, possessed an intellect that was as sharp as you can get, able to absorb issues large and small and he was utterly charming. He had time for everyone and would always go that extra mile to ensure that everything he did was 100% or more. We were all the beneficiaries of his wisdom and advice.
"Whether in the Regiment or in the many demanding appointments held in the Army he touched all with his infectious enthusiasm, sense of humour and sheer professionalism. He was acutely aware of the dangers his Battalion in Afghanistan faced having already seen a number of his men killed in action and injured in battle on the tour. But he led from the front inspiring confidence, trust and huge respect from those under his command who will all miss him greatly, as we will at home.
"His death is a huge loss to us all and all our thoughts and prayers are with his time. We will always remember him as one of our very best. He was a simply remarkable man and officer and a great Welsh Guardsman."
Major Andrew Speed, the Battalion Second in Command, said:
"I was very fortunate to be the second in command to a truly talented officer. To see him in operation was an inspirational sight. His attention to detail and his drive were extremely impressive. When we were flagging through late nights and early mornings he still had the resilience to push on.
"As a man he did not seek personal gain. His motivation was always for the Welsh Guards, his men and his family. This was his focus and this is what drove him to work as he did. He was compassionate and caring and despite working us hard he always had words of encouragement and he always took time out to laugh and joke keeping our morale high even in the toughest of circumstances.
"I shared an office with him for the last nine months. It was a privilege that I will never forget because sitting there listening to him in action taught me more than any staff course ever could.
"To lose such a man while on operations is a considerable blow. But it is blow that will not discourage us. We have been moulded into an effective team by a great leader who would have wanted us to complete our task in Afghanistan. It is a task that he passionately believed in and we will not let him down in the relentless pursuit of the goals that he set us.
"His wife Sally and his two daughters Hannah and Sophie are in our thoughts and prayers because our loss, although great, is nothing in comparison to theirs."
Major Guy Stone, one of the Company Commanders, said:
"Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe was not only a truly great friend but an outstanding man for whom to work. He was kind, very thoughtful, utterly decent and someone who had complete loyalty from and deep admiration of all his Company Commanders. He was the perfect military guide for us all and there was no better moral compass. He would always listen and never forgot a thing. He adored the Welsh Guards: the Regiment, the Battalion but especially his Guardsmen. We knew, as a Battalion warned for Afghanistan, that we were in very best of hands. His great intellect, thoroughness and deep care for those under his command gave us huge confidence. He never missed a trick and he was even always one step ahead of the most mischievous Guardsman. He amazed us with his enviable capacity for work. We all know that Colonel Rupert's reputation was undoubted from the highest echelons of the Army, and indeed the Government having worked closely for the Secretary of State for Defence. But above all this, and what hurts most of all, is that he was a very loving husband to Sally and father to Hannah and Sophie. I had the very deepest respect for him and I will miss him enormously, but now he would now want us to continue with added determination and drive with his cry 'all of one Company'."
Major Martyn Miles, the Battle Group Logistics Officer, said:
"Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe MBE was a superb Welsh Guardsman who loved his Battalion. He died leading his men from the front, and I for one have felt his loss enormously having served with him on many occasions including beside him as the Regimental Sergeant Major when he held the appointment of Adjutant.
"Since our arrival in Helmand Province, the Battle Group has achieved amazing things under the command of Colonel Rupert. He was confident that within our time we would increase and deepen security within our area of responsibility (AOR).
"Col Rupert was a great solider himself, and a great leader of men, an example to other Commanding Officers. Every incident that happened with our AOR he praised his men for their professionalism and dedication to duty and encouraged them to carry on.
"The Battalion will now carry on as he would have wanted us to do, as a family Regiment. We will draw from the great strength within using pride, determination and the love for the Commanding Officer. We will drive forward to achieve the objectives that he felt so passionate about.
"He will be truly missed by all ranks that were lucky enough to serve under his Command.
"My thoughts and prayers are with Sally and the two young daughters Hannah and ophie. God Bless."
Captain James Aldridge, the Adjutant, said:
"Being Colonel Rupert's Adjutant was hard work, but it was also very rewarding. There were many late nights, but I had the privilege of watching and learning from a highly capable man. He demanded the highest standards from those under his command, but justifiably, as he also set the highest standards himself. He would never take the easy option, but would always spend the extra time to work out what the best solution would be for the Battalion, and also for the individuals concerned. He could not have been prouder of the Regiment, nor cared more deeply for its members. He would never have asked anyone to do anything he was not prepared to do himself, and he died doing just that - leading from the front. He will be sorely missed by the Battalion, and all who knew him."
Captain Ed Launders, the Operations Officer, said:
"Lieutenant Colonel Thorneloe was a man apart; he combined an astute military brain with real compassion for the men under his command and a unique ability to spot opportunities where others would not. He led the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards Battle Group with the steadiest of hands in often the most difficult of circumstances; he was utterly committed to his men, and to bringing about lasting improvement to the lives of the people of Afghanistan.
"I have served under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thorneloe as a platoon commander in his company, and as his operations officer in Afghanistan. It has been a real privilege to witness a true master at work. His intelligence and imagination, combined with selfless determination, left the rest of us in his wake. His humanity and good humour means that he will leave behind a happy and bonded team with an utter determination to succeed.
"I will remember him for his kindness, humour and ability to get the very best out of his team. He will be sorely missed."
Warrant Officer Class I (Regimental Sergeant Major) Michael Monaghan said:
"Words can not express the sadness that has been felt by the loss of the Commanding Officer. My immediate thoughts are for his family and they have my deepest sympathy. I knew the Commanding Officer since he was a young Platoon Commander and the first encounter I had with him was as a result of his considerable qualities as an Officer when he was selected to lead the Battalion's team for the Cambrian Patrol Competition. The Commanding Officer was the ultimate professional in everything he did and no stone was left unturned in his quest to ensure that everything was done correctly in order to improve the lives, more often than not at the expense of his personal life, of the men in their careers and personal circumstances. The Commanding Officer was an extremely talented leader and was the kind of man that you would follow anywhere knowing that you were in very capable hands. He will be greatly missed by all of the Battalion and I will always remember him for everything that he did for the men and the kindness that he showed to everybody. He was a truly great man."
Trooper Joshua Hammond
2nd Royal Tank Regiment
Lt Col Marcus Simson, Commanding Officer 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, said:
"Trooper Joshua Hammond enlisted in the Army aged 16 ½ and attended the Army Foundation College in Harrogate to complete his initial training. From Harrogate, having been accepted into the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, Trooper Hammond moved to Bovington to learn his trade as a Challenger 2 tank driver. He arrived with the Regiment in Tidworth in May 2008, shortly before his 18th birthday and within months had deployed with his Squadron to Canada where he spent a happy and fulfilling 3 months training on the Prairie. He quickly established himself as a professional and capable young soldier, full of potential and with a future full of promise.
"On his return from Canada, Trooper Hammond volunteered to change Squadron in order to deploy to Afghanistan. He threw himself into life in his new Squadron, the pre-deployment training and his conversion to the VIKING vehicle that he would be operating in Theatre. He deployed with his Squadron to Afghanistan exactly a month ago. In the month he had in Theatre, he proved himself to be a superb soldier. Fit, courageous, and robust, he was the first to volunteer, the first to muck in and the first to offer help to others. But he was so much more than that. For he was at the heart of everything that was going on. He was full of laughter, was always ready to listen and he cared deeply about his mates.
"Known Regimentally as Josh, Trooper Hammond died on patrol doing the job he loved, amongst his friends, the week before his 19th birthday. He was proud to be a Tankie, and we are proud to have served with him. His tragic death has left a vast hole in our hearts - both those in his Squadron in Afghanistan and those of us left behind in the UK. Our thoughts at this time are with his family and friends, but most particularly with his parents and his fiancée."
Major Charlie Burbridge, Officer Commanding Egypt Squadron, 2RTR, said:
"Hammy joined 2 RTR in May 2008 and it was clear from the outset that he was going to be a fine soldier. He took pride in his fitness and was determined to be the best tank driver he could be. He succeeded. He also succeeded in being admitted into the EGYPT bad tattoo club and very swiftly became a central figure in the squadron.
"Hammy was a quiet, unassuming but highly courageous young man with a roguish sense of humour. Earnest, thoughtful and happy, he was an essential part of my squadron and he died, a week before his nineteenth birthday, doing a fine job as a proud soldier. He had a glint in his eye and a wry smile which always made one feel that you were in on the joke. He was professional and capable and was only just getting into his stride as a soldier. Only days before his tragic death he had said how much he was enjoying the job.
"My words will do little to console his mother or fiancé whom he planned to marry on his return from Afghanistan but our prayers are for them. Hammy was a Tankie, through and through; I am proud to have served alongside him and we will never forget him."
Lieutenant Terry Newton, said:
"Tpr Josh Hammond was an easy going and popular individual who fitted in exceptionally well within our Troop. He was a jovial character who always had an air of mischief about him that made being his Troop Leader so enjoyable. Josh's performance in Afghanistan was superb and he continually proved his quality as a field soldier. Josh was a quietly courageous character who met adversity with a smile, a murmured joke and a 'can do' attitude. He will be sorely missed by everyone who ever had the privilege of knowing him."
Lance Corporal Chris Burwood, said:
"Josh Hammond was a kind and generous person who wasn't scared to get his hands dirty. He was always the first in every situation whether in the field or in camp. His thirst for adventure was second to none, and even though he was new to the Regiment, he was liked by everyone that knew him.
"Our thoughts at this time are with his family and friends. Our loss is felt throughout the squadron, and he will surely be missed."
Trooper Chris Stone, said:
"Josh was among my closest friends in 2RTR, one of a few whose company I could really appreciate. As I am writing this I'm finding it hard to keep my feelings stable and can only imagine the effect this will have on his friends, family and fiancée. Its going to be hard doing all the things we planned together and I can't imagine being able to do it without him.
"I miss you mate, always will. Chris."
Trooper Patrick Flowers, said:
"Josh was a nice lad. He was always there to help us out and listen to our problems. Josh was a trustworthy guy, had a great sense of humour, and loved drinking and dancing with the lads. Josh was a remarkable character."
Trooper Ben Probets, said:
"Josh Hammond was one of the few great people in this world. No matter how bad times got, he always had something to laugh about. He hadn't he hadn't been in EGYPT long, but the short time of being with us he made a lot of friends, me being
one of them. I didn't know him at all before January, but it didn't take long to realise just what sort of person he was. He was only 18 years old, with his birthday coming up in 8 days, but in these short 18 years he achieved what some people could achieve in a lifetime. With a loving fiancée at his side, this is a devastating blow. His life will live on in our memory and our hearts. God rest his sole. RIP Josh Hammond."
Trooper Adam Minns, said:
"Josh Hammond was a brilliant soldier and a one of a kind bloke. We spent three
months working together in Canada. Josh helped me prepare my vehicle into the early
hours of the morning even though he had his own vehicle to fix. We had some laughs
together in Canada. Josh always went out of his way to help his fellow colleagues
no matter what the problem was. He cheered me up when I felt down and you could
talk to him about anything. Josh was the most trustworthy person and a top bloke to
everyone. He will always be in our hearts forever and always."
Trooper Tom Henderson, said:
"Josh was a true soldier's soldier. An essential member of any night out, boasting vast knowledge of good bars and bad drinks. He was one of the main reasons 3 Troop were banned from ordering Jager bombs at a function in Tidworth having spent £200 of the squadron's money in 10 minutes. At work when I was struggling with a wagon he'd be the first to come over and help me destroy it faster. He joined the Army immediately after school, volunteered for HERRICK, and volunteered to go out on the ground with his troop as a dismount.
"He wasn't out here to serve his country, or earn respect, or for the money. He was out here to have an adventure with his mates, to drive a big wagon around a strange country and have a laugh doing it."
Welcome
Welcome to the UK Defence Forum Defence Viewpoints blogsite. It features original contributions and reviews, sometimes of a slightly partisan nature. It is also highlights interesting defence, security and peace information and opinion from across the political spectrum – from newspaper articles to reports by thinktanks and academics, reproduced with permission. Visitors are invited to add their own comments on individual items - anonymous ones are however more likely to be moderated - or to make contributions - see footer.
18 July 2009
Reaction to the CIA Assassination Program
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
On June 23, 2009, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta learned of a highly compartmentalized program to assassinate al Qaeda operatives that was launched by the CIA in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. When Panetta found out that the covert program had not been disclosed to Congress, he canceled it and then called an emergency meeting June 24 to brief congressional oversight committees on the program. Over the past week, many details of the program have been leaked to the press and the issue has received extensive media coverage.
That a program existed to assassinate al Qaeda leaders should certainly come as no surprise to anyone. It has been well-publicized that the Clinton administration had launched military operations and attempted to use covert programs to strike the al Qaeda leadership in the wake of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. In fact, the Clinton administration has come under strong criticism for not doing more to decapitate al Qaeda prior to 2001. Furthermore, since 2002, the CIA has conducted scores of strikes against al Qaeda targets in Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-1 Predator and the larger MQ-9 Reaper.
These strikes have dramatically increased over the past two years and the pace did not slacken when the Obama administration came to power in January. So far in 2009 there have been more than two dozen UAV strikes in Pakistan alone. In November 2002, the CIA also employed a UAV to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi, a senior al Qaeda leader suspected of planning the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole. The U.S. government has also attacked al Qaeda leaders at other times and in other places, such as the May 1, 2008, attack against al Qaeda-linked figures in Somalia using an AC-130 gunship.
As early as Oct. 28, 2001, The Washington Post ran a story discussing the Clinton-era presidential finding authorizing operations to capture or kill al Qaeda targets. The Oct. 28 Washington Post story also provided details of a finding signed by President George W. Bush following the 9/11 attacks that reportedly provided authorization to strike a larger cross section of al Qaeda targets, including those who are not in the Afghan theater of operations. Such presidential findings are used to authorize covert actions, but in this case the finding would also provide permission to contravene Executive Order 12333, which prohibits assassinations.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bush and the members of his administration were very clear that they sought to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and the members of the al Qaeda organization. During the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections in the United States, every major candidate, including Barack Obama, stated that they would seek to kill bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda. Indeed, on the campaign trail, Obama was quite vocal in his criticism of the Bush administration for not doing more to go after al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan. This means that, regardless of who is in the White House, it is U.S. policy to go after individual al Qaeda members as well as the al Qaeda organization.
In light of these facts, it would appear that there was nothing particularly controversial about the covert assassination program itself, and the controversy that has arisen over it has more to do with the failure to report covert activities to Congress. The political uproar and the manner in which the program was canceled, however, will likely have a negative impact on CIA morale and U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Program Details
As noted above, that the U.S. government has attempted to locate and kill al Qaeda members is not shocking. Bush’s signing of a classified finding authorizing the assassination of al Qaeda members has been a poorly kept secret for many years now, and the U.S. government has succeeded in killing al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
While Hellfire missiles are quite effective at hitting trucks in Yemen and AC-130 gunships are great for striking walled compounds in the Somali badlands, there are many places in the world where it is simply not possible to use such tools against militants. One cannot launch a hellfire from a UAV at a target in Milan or use an AC-130 to attack a target in Doha. Furthermore, there are certain parts of the world — including some countries considered to be U.S. allies — where it is very difficult for the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations at all. These difficulties have been seen in past cases where the governments have refused U.S. requests to detain terrorist suspects or have alerted the suspects to the U.S. interest in them, compromising U.S. intelligence efforts and allowing the suspects to flee.
A prime example of this occurred in 1996, when the United States asked the government of Qatar for assistance in capturing al Qaeda operational mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was living openly in Qatar and even working for the Qatari government as a project engineer. Mohammed was tipped off to American intentions by the Qatari authorities and fled to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 commission report, Mohammed was closely associated with Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani, who was then the Qatari minister of religious affairs. After fleeing Doha, Mohammed went on to plan several al Qaeda attacks against the United States, including the 9/11 operation.
Given these realities, it appears that the recently disclosed assassination program was intended to provide the United States with a far more subtle and surgical tool to use in attacks against al Qaeda leaders in locations where Hellfire missiles are not appropriate and where host government assistance is unlikely to be provided. Some media reports indicate that the program was never fully developed and deployed; others indicate that it may have conducted a limited number of operations.
Unlike UAV strikes, where pilots fly the vehicles by satellite link and can actually be located a half a world away, or the very tough and resilient airframe of an AC-130, which can fly thousands of feet above a target, a surgical assassination capability means that the CIA would have to put boots on the ground in hostile territory where operatives, by their very presence, would be violating the laws of the sovereign country in which they were operating. Such operatives, under nonofficial cover by necessity, would be at risk of arrest if they were detected.
Also, because of the nature of such a program, a higher level of operational security is required than in the program to strike al Qaeda targets using UAVs. It is far more complex to move officers and weapons into hostile territory in a stealthy manner to strike a target without warning and with plausible deniability. Once a target is struck with a barrage of Hellfire missiles, it is fairly hard to deny what happened. There is ample physical evidence tying the attack to American UAVs. When a person is struck by a sniper’s bullet or a small IED, the perpetrator and sponsor have far more deniability. By its very nature, and by operational necessity, such a program must be extremely covert.
Even with the cooperation of the host government, conducting an extraordinary rendition in a friendly country like Italy has proved to be politically controversial and personally risky for CIA officers, who can be threatened with arrest and trial. Conducting assassination operations in a country that is not so friendly is a far riskier undertaking. As seen by the Russian officers arrested in Doha after the February 2004 assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, such operations can generate blowback. The Russian officers responsible for the Yandarbiyev hit were arrested, tortured, tried and sentenced to life in prison (though after several months they were released into Russian custody to serve the remainder of their sentences).
Because of the physical risk to the officers involved in such operations, and the political blowback such operations can cause, it is not surprising that the details of such a program would be strictly compartmentalized inside the CIA and not widely disseminated beyond the gates of Langley. In fact, it is highly doubtful that the details of such a program were even widely known inside the CIA’s counterterrorism center (CTC) — though almost certainly some of the CTC staff suspected that such a covert program existed somewhere. The details regarding such a program were undoubtedly guarded carefully within the clandestine service, with the officer in charge most likely reporting directly to the deputy director of operations, who reports personally to the director of the CIA.
Loose Lips Sink Ships
As trite as this old saying may sound, it is painfully true. In the counterterrorism realm, leaks destroy counterterrorism cases and often allow terrorist suspects to escape and kill again. There have been several leaks of “sources and methods” by congressional sources over the past decade that have disclosed details of sensitive U.S. government programs designed to do things such as intercept al Qaeda satellite phone signals and track al Qaeda financing. A classified appendix to the report of the 2005 Robb-Silberman Commission on Intelligence Capabilities (which incidentally was leaked to the press) discussed several such leaks, noted the costs they impose on the American taxpayers and highlighted the damage they do to intelligence programs.
The fear that details of a sensitive program designed to assassinate al Qaeda operatives in foreign countries could be leaked was probably the reason for the Bush administration’s decision to withhold knowledge of the program from the U.S. Congress, even though amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 mandate the reporting of most covert intelligence programs to Congress. Given the imaginative legal guidance provided by Bush administration lawyers regarding subjects such as enhanced interrogation, it would not be surprising to find that White House lawyers focused on loopholes in the National Security Act reporting requirements.
The validity of such legal opinions may soon be tested. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, recently said he was considering an investigation into the failure to report the program to Congress, and House Democrats have announced that they want to change the reporting requirements to make them even more inclusive.
Under the current version of the National Security Act, with very few exceptions, the administration is required to report the most sensitive covert activities to, at the very least, the so-called “gang of eight” that includes the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. In the wake of the program’s disclosure, some Democrats would like to expand this minimum reporting requirement to include the entire membership of the congressional intelligence committees, which would increase the absolute minimum number of people to be briefed from eight to 40. Some congressmen argue that presidents, prompted by the CIA, are too loose in their invocation of the “extraordinary circumstances” that allow them to report only to the gang of eight and not the full committees. Yet ironically, the existence of the covert CIA program stayed secret for over seven and a half years, and yet here we are writing about it less than a month after the congressional committees were briefed.
The addition of that many additional lips to briefings pertaining to covert actions is not the only thing that will cause great consternation at the CIA. While legally mandated, disclosing covert programs to Congress has been very problematic. The angst felt at Langley over potential increases in the number of people to be briefed will be compounded by the recent reports that Attorney General Eric Holder may appoint a special prosecutor to investigate CIA interrogations and ethics reporting.
In April we discussed how some of the early actions of the Obama administration were having a chilling effect on U.S. counterterrorism programs and personnel. Expanding the minimum reporting requirements under the National Security Act will serve to turn the thermostat down several additional notches, as did Panetta’s overt killing of the covert program. It is one thing to quietly kill a controversial program; it is quite another to repudiate the CIA in public. In addition to damaging the already low morale at the agency, Panetta has announced in a very public manner that the United States has taken one important tool entirely out of the counterterrorism toolbox: Al Qaeda no longer has to fear the possibility of clandestine American assassination teams.
Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.stratfor.com. Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
On June 23, 2009, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta learned of a highly compartmentalized program to assassinate al Qaeda operatives that was launched by the CIA in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. When Panetta found out that the covert program had not been disclosed to Congress, he canceled it and then called an emergency meeting June 24 to brief congressional oversight committees on the program. Over the past week, many details of the program have been leaked to the press and the issue has received extensive media coverage.
That a program existed to assassinate al Qaeda leaders should certainly come as no surprise to anyone. It has been well-publicized that the Clinton administration had launched military operations and attempted to use covert programs to strike the al Qaeda leadership in the wake of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. In fact, the Clinton administration has come under strong criticism for not doing more to decapitate al Qaeda prior to 2001. Furthermore, since 2002, the CIA has conducted scores of strikes against al Qaeda targets in Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-1 Predator and the larger MQ-9 Reaper.
These strikes have dramatically increased over the past two years and the pace did not slacken when the Obama administration came to power in January. So far in 2009 there have been more than two dozen UAV strikes in Pakistan alone. In November 2002, the CIA also employed a UAV to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi, a senior al Qaeda leader suspected of planning the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole. The U.S. government has also attacked al Qaeda leaders at other times and in other places, such as the May 1, 2008, attack against al Qaeda-linked figures in Somalia using an AC-130 gunship.
As early as Oct. 28, 2001, The Washington Post ran a story discussing the Clinton-era presidential finding authorizing operations to capture or kill al Qaeda targets. The Oct. 28 Washington Post story also provided details of a finding signed by President George W. Bush following the 9/11 attacks that reportedly provided authorization to strike a larger cross section of al Qaeda targets, including those who are not in the Afghan theater of operations. Such presidential findings are used to authorize covert actions, but in this case the finding would also provide permission to contravene Executive Order 12333, which prohibits assassinations.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bush and the members of his administration were very clear that they sought to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and the members of the al Qaeda organization. During the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections in the United States, every major candidate, including Barack Obama, stated that they would seek to kill bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda. Indeed, on the campaign trail, Obama was quite vocal in his criticism of the Bush administration for not doing more to go after al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan. This means that, regardless of who is in the White House, it is U.S. policy to go after individual al Qaeda members as well as the al Qaeda organization.
In light of these facts, it would appear that there was nothing particularly controversial about the covert assassination program itself, and the controversy that has arisen over it has more to do with the failure to report covert activities to Congress. The political uproar and the manner in which the program was canceled, however, will likely have a negative impact on CIA morale and U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Program Details
As noted above, that the U.S. government has attempted to locate and kill al Qaeda members is not shocking. Bush’s signing of a classified finding authorizing the assassination of al Qaeda members has been a poorly kept secret for many years now, and the U.S. government has succeeded in killing al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
While Hellfire missiles are quite effective at hitting trucks in Yemen and AC-130 gunships are great for striking walled compounds in the Somali badlands, there are many places in the world where it is simply not possible to use such tools against militants. One cannot launch a hellfire from a UAV at a target in Milan or use an AC-130 to attack a target in Doha. Furthermore, there are certain parts of the world — including some countries considered to be U.S. allies — where it is very difficult for the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations at all. These difficulties have been seen in past cases where the governments have refused U.S. requests to detain terrorist suspects or have alerted the suspects to the U.S. interest in them, compromising U.S. intelligence efforts and allowing the suspects to flee.
A prime example of this occurred in 1996, when the United States asked the government of Qatar for assistance in capturing al Qaeda operational mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was living openly in Qatar and even working for the Qatari government as a project engineer. Mohammed was tipped off to American intentions by the Qatari authorities and fled to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 commission report, Mohammed was closely associated with Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani, who was then the Qatari minister of religious affairs. After fleeing Doha, Mohammed went on to plan several al Qaeda attacks against the United States, including the 9/11 operation.
Given these realities, it appears that the recently disclosed assassination program was intended to provide the United States with a far more subtle and surgical tool to use in attacks against al Qaeda leaders in locations where Hellfire missiles are not appropriate and where host government assistance is unlikely to be provided. Some media reports indicate that the program was never fully developed and deployed; others indicate that it may have conducted a limited number of operations.
Unlike UAV strikes, where pilots fly the vehicles by satellite link and can actually be located a half a world away, or the very tough and resilient airframe of an AC-130, which can fly thousands of feet above a target, a surgical assassination capability means that the CIA would have to put boots on the ground in hostile territory where operatives, by their very presence, would be violating the laws of the sovereign country in which they were operating. Such operatives, under nonofficial cover by necessity, would be at risk of arrest if they were detected.
Also, because of the nature of such a program, a higher level of operational security is required than in the program to strike al Qaeda targets using UAVs. It is far more complex to move officers and weapons into hostile territory in a stealthy manner to strike a target without warning and with plausible deniability. Once a target is struck with a barrage of Hellfire missiles, it is fairly hard to deny what happened. There is ample physical evidence tying the attack to American UAVs. When a person is struck by a sniper’s bullet or a small IED, the perpetrator and sponsor have far more deniability. By its very nature, and by operational necessity, such a program must be extremely covert.
Even with the cooperation of the host government, conducting an extraordinary rendition in a friendly country like Italy has proved to be politically controversial and personally risky for CIA officers, who can be threatened with arrest and trial. Conducting assassination operations in a country that is not so friendly is a far riskier undertaking. As seen by the Russian officers arrested in Doha after the February 2004 assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, such operations can generate blowback. The Russian officers responsible for the Yandarbiyev hit were arrested, tortured, tried and sentenced to life in prison (though after several months they were released into Russian custody to serve the remainder of their sentences).
Because of the physical risk to the officers involved in such operations, and the political blowback such operations can cause, it is not surprising that the details of such a program would be strictly compartmentalized inside the CIA and not widely disseminated beyond the gates of Langley. In fact, it is highly doubtful that the details of such a program were even widely known inside the CIA’s counterterrorism center (CTC) — though almost certainly some of the CTC staff suspected that such a covert program existed somewhere. The details regarding such a program were undoubtedly guarded carefully within the clandestine service, with the officer in charge most likely reporting directly to the deputy director of operations, who reports personally to the director of the CIA.
Loose Lips Sink Ships
As trite as this old saying may sound, it is painfully true. In the counterterrorism realm, leaks destroy counterterrorism cases and often allow terrorist suspects to escape and kill again. There have been several leaks of “sources and methods” by congressional sources over the past decade that have disclosed details of sensitive U.S. government programs designed to do things such as intercept al Qaeda satellite phone signals and track al Qaeda financing. A classified appendix to the report of the 2005 Robb-Silberman Commission on Intelligence Capabilities (which incidentally was leaked to the press) discussed several such leaks, noted the costs they impose on the American taxpayers and highlighted the damage they do to intelligence programs.
The fear that details of a sensitive program designed to assassinate al Qaeda operatives in foreign countries could be leaked was probably the reason for the Bush administration’s decision to withhold knowledge of the program from the U.S. Congress, even though amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 mandate the reporting of most covert intelligence programs to Congress. Given the imaginative legal guidance provided by Bush administration lawyers regarding subjects such as enhanced interrogation, it would not be surprising to find that White House lawyers focused on loopholes in the National Security Act reporting requirements.
The validity of such legal opinions may soon be tested. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, recently said he was considering an investigation into the failure to report the program to Congress, and House Democrats have announced that they want to change the reporting requirements to make them even more inclusive.
Under the current version of the National Security Act, with very few exceptions, the administration is required to report the most sensitive covert activities to, at the very least, the so-called “gang of eight” that includes the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. In the wake of the program’s disclosure, some Democrats would like to expand this minimum reporting requirement to include the entire membership of the congressional intelligence committees, which would increase the absolute minimum number of people to be briefed from eight to 40. Some congressmen argue that presidents, prompted by the CIA, are too loose in their invocation of the “extraordinary circumstances” that allow them to report only to the gang of eight and not the full committees. Yet ironically, the existence of the covert CIA program stayed secret for over seven and a half years, and yet here we are writing about it less than a month after the congressional committees were briefed.
The addition of that many additional lips to briefings pertaining to covert actions is not the only thing that will cause great consternation at the CIA. While legally mandated, disclosing covert programs to Congress has been very problematic. The angst felt at Langley over potential increases in the number of people to be briefed will be compounded by the recent reports that Attorney General Eric Holder may appoint a special prosecutor to investigate CIA interrogations and ethics reporting.
In April we discussed how some of the early actions of the Obama administration were having a chilling effect on U.S. counterterrorism programs and personnel. Expanding the minimum reporting requirements under the National Security Act will serve to turn the thermostat down several additional notches, as did Panetta’s overt killing of the covert program. It is one thing to quietly kill a controversial program; it is quite another to repudiate the CIA in public. In addition to damaging the already low morale at the agency, Panetta has announced in a very public manner that the United States has taken one important tool entirely out of the counterterrorism toolbox: Al Qaeda no longer has to fear the possibility of clandestine American assassination teams.
Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.stratfor.com. Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
17 July 2009
Every MP should have a second job
By Opit Hop
While revelations over MPs’ expenses over the last few months may have rocked Westminster and damaged public confidence in politicians, they have also prompted us to ask important questions about the rules governing the behaviour of our elected representatives.
Significantly, some MPs have been attacked as ‘part-timers’ for having business and other interests above and beyond their parliamentary duties. Particular ire has been heaped on those MPs who hold well-paid directorships with major companies. It is, critics argue, inappropriate for parliamentarians to have outside business interests.
But the people who say this are wrong. MPs with second jobs are better MPs and help to make our democracy more effective and more representative.
By taking additional paid employment, it is argued, MPs provide less value and a poorer service to their constituents. Yet, in reality, MPs with outside interests tend to add value to the legislature and provide a better service. Backbench MPs in particular have flexible hours and tend to work accordingly – if the House is sitting late, or if there is a 10pm vote, no-one expects them to work solidly all day without a break. And many of the outside jobs that have received the most attention represent a very modest time commitment – as low as a few days per year and typically a day a month.
We have a right to hold our representatives to account – but they have a right to choose how to use their spare time. Some MPs may choose to use this time to see their families and children; others might use it for recreation and leisure; and others might use it for a second job. It’s their choice. And simply because an MP has an outside interest, it does not mean he or she devotes less time to their constituents. Parliamentarians should be judged on their overall effectiveness and there is one very powerful mechanism for this – if you don’t think your MP is doing his or her job, vote them out, or threaten to. To paraphrase Johnson, there’s nothing like an impending election to focus a MP’s mind.
No-one is suggesting that being an MP is not an important full-time job. But outside interests keep parliamentarians in touch with the real world. MPs with outside interests tend to be more rounded and effective individuals. And, after the recent expenses scandals, we should be encouraging more MPs to look beyond Westminster and to become less institutionalised. Banning second jobs would have the opposite effect. Many commentators have criticised the effect of the ‘Westminster bubble’ in clouding legislators’ judgement: by encouraging parliamentarians to have outside interests, we are helping to burst this bubble, or at least to reduce its viscosity.
The media focus has – understandably – been on those MPs with highly-paid business interests. But what about the rest? A couple of MPs are special constables (a demanding 16 hours per month); some are part-time soldiers; others are practicing GPs or pharmacists; and many act as trustees or sit on the advisory boards of charities. Virtually every MP does a number of pro bono activities daily – speaking at events and seminars, attending dinners or writing articles for magazines. And a surprising number of MPs are local councillors or members of regional assemblies.
And the most common and time-consuming second job is that of being a Government minister.
One MP in particular stands out as having a second job that consumes almost all his time – the right honourable member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, Dr Gordon Brown MP.
A lot of MPs do a lot of things that aren’t directly related to their main job as an MP and the criticism of second jobs in the media has been very selective. The issue isn’t so much about the time spent on these jobs but, rather, about the money paid and the risk of conflicts of interest arising. Yet even on these points the critics aren’t on firm ground.
Some jobs that MPs do are paid a lot; others are not paid at all (e.g. as a charity trustee); and others are used to help meet the costs of running a members’ office. But whatever role an MP has in an outside organisation, why should he or she be paid less simply because he or she is an MP? It seems manifestly unfair that a parliamentarian who is a non-executive director of a company should be paid any less than someone similarly qualified who is doing the same job and who has the same responsibilities. If an MP writes a good book, why should he or she be paid less for doing so than anyone else? That William Hague gets a high advance for his work as an author reflects the fact that he’s a very good, very popular author. And how would a cap on MPs’ pay be administered? It would be neither sensible, nor practical, nor fair.
What the recent debates over second jobs have exposed is one very important point: that our representatives should be accountable and be part of a transparent system that effectively avoid conflicts of interest and maintains public confidence. For this reason, it seems not only sensible but obvious that ministers and others should not have significant outside interests. Moreover, if MPs are taking on ‘parliamentary consultancy’ roles that are no more than paid lobbying, their job description should make that clear (that would make them think again). A clear description of what elected representatives do outside Parliament is essential. But trenchant regulation would not only be an administrative minefield, but would also further entrench the dominance of professional politicians over people with real-world experience.
Politics is an all-encompassing business and therefore needs all-encompassing people from diverse backgrounds. By providing transparency and accountability, we can create a system that both creates public confidence and recognises the value of outside employment. MPs and political parties should not be afraid to make this case and should not hold back from extolling the importance of parliamentarians having second jobs and real-world experience. Voters have a right to a fair day’s work from their MP. A second job can help make that a good day’s work too.
While revelations over MPs’ expenses over the last few months may have rocked Westminster and damaged public confidence in politicians, they have also prompted us to ask important questions about the rules governing the behaviour of our elected representatives.
Significantly, some MPs have been attacked as ‘part-timers’ for having business and other interests above and beyond their parliamentary duties. Particular ire has been heaped on those MPs who hold well-paid directorships with major companies. It is, critics argue, inappropriate for parliamentarians to have outside business interests.
But the people who say this are wrong. MPs with second jobs are better MPs and help to make our democracy more effective and more representative.
By taking additional paid employment, it is argued, MPs provide less value and a poorer service to their constituents. Yet, in reality, MPs with outside interests tend to add value to the legislature and provide a better service. Backbench MPs in particular have flexible hours and tend to work accordingly – if the House is sitting late, or if there is a 10pm vote, no-one expects them to work solidly all day without a break. And many of the outside jobs that have received the most attention represent a very modest time commitment – as low as a few days per year and typically a day a month.
We have a right to hold our representatives to account – but they have a right to choose how to use their spare time. Some MPs may choose to use this time to see their families and children; others might use it for recreation and leisure; and others might use it for a second job. It’s their choice. And simply because an MP has an outside interest, it does not mean he or she devotes less time to their constituents. Parliamentarians should be judged on their overall effectiveness and there is one very powerful mechanism for this – if you don’t think your MP is doing his or her job, vote them out, or threaten to. To paraphrase Johnson, there’s nothing like an impending election to focus a MP’s mind.
No-one is suggesting that being an MP is not an important full-time job. But outside interests keep parliamentarians in touch with the real world. MPs with outside interests tend to be more rounded and effective individuals. And, after the recent expenses scandals, we should be encouraging more MPs to look beyond Westminster and to become less institutionalised. Banning second jobs would have the opposite effect. Many commentators have criticised the effect of the ‘Westminster bubble’ in clouding legislators’ judgement: by encouraging parliamentarians to have outside interests, we are helping to burst this bubble, or at least to reduce its viscosity.
The media focus has – understandably – been on those MPs with highly-paid business interests. But what about the rest? A couple of MPs are special constables (a demanding 16 hours per month); some are part-time soldiers; others are practicing GPs or pharmacists; and many act as trustees or sit on the advisory boards of charities. Virtually every MP does a number of pro bono activities daily – speaking at events and seminars, attending dinners or writing articles for magazines. And a surprising number of MPs are local councillors or members of regional assemblies.
And the most common and time-consuming second job is that of being a Government minister.
One MP in particular stands out as having a second job that consumes almost all his time – the right honourable member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, Dr Gordon Brown MP.
A lot of MPs do a lot of things that aren’t directly related to their main job as an MP and the criticism of second jobs in the media has been very selective. The issue isn’t so much about the time spent on these jobs but, rather, about the money paid and the risk of conflicts of interest arising. Yet even on these points the critics aren’t on firm ground.
Some jobs that MPs do are paid a lot; others are not paid at all (e.g. as a charity trustee); and others are used to help meet the costs of running a members’ office. But whatever role an MP has in an outside organisation, why should he or she be paid less simply because he or she is an MP? It seems manifestly unfair that a parliamentarian who is a non-executive director of a company should be paid any less than someone similarly qualified who is doing the same job and who has the same responsibilities. If an MP writes a good book, why should he or she be paid less for doing so than anyone else? That William Hague gets a high advance for his work as an author reflects the fact that he’s a very good, very popular author. And how would a cap on MPs’ pay be administered? It would be neither sensible, nor practical, nor fair.
What the recent debates over second jobs have exposed is one very important point: that our representatives should be accountable and be part of a transparent system that effectively avoid conflicts of interest and maintains public confidence. For this reason, it seems not only sensible but obvious that ministers and others should not have significant outside interests. Moreover, if MPs are taking on ‘parliamentary consultancy’ roles that are no more than paid lobbying, their job description should make that clear (that would make them think again). A clear description of what elected representatives do outside Parliament is essential. But trenchant regulation would not only be an administrative minefield, but would also further entrench the dominance of professional politicians over people with real-world experience.
Politics is an all-encompassing business and therefore needs all-encompassing people from diverse backgrounds. By providing transparency and accountability, we can create a system that both creates public confidence and recognises the value of outside employment. MPs and political parties should not be afraid to make this case and should not hold back from extolling the importance of parliamentarians having second jobs and real-world experience. Voters have a right to a fair day’s work from their MP. A second job can help make that a good day’s work too.
Today's headlines
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aytheon Company has been awarded a contract by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to provide a cost-effective, highly capable military wireless network interoperable gateway.
Raytheon Press Release
Telespazio (Finmeccanica/Thales) and the Turkish Defence Ministry sign contract to build the Göktürk satellite system
Telespazio, a company owned by Finmeccanica and Thales, signed a contract in Turkey worth over EUR 250 million for the construction of the Göktürk satellite system.
Finmeccanica Press Release
Panel funds F-22 program Defense wants cut
Pentagon appropriators in the U.S. House ignored a threatened veto by President Barack Obama and voted to keep the F-22 fighter jet program Thursday.
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Gates vows real fight over U.S. defense budget
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned on Thursday that Congress faces a veto threat over defense spending if lawmakers try to force more F-22 fighters onto President Barack Obama's reform effort.
Reuters
Armed forces campaigners set out the case for higher defence spending in the midst of recession
Funding for Britain’s Armed Forces must be protected from public expenditure cuts, in spite of the heavy financial pressures faced by the Government, and the defence budget should be increased over the next three years to at least three per cent of GDP, according to a paper published today (July 17) by the United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA).
UKNDA
MOD launches consultation to further improve Armed Forces welfare
The MoD has published a Green Paper, “The Nation’s Commitment to the Armed Forces Community: Consistent and Enduring Support”, which will look at how to prevent Service personnel and their families being disadvantaged due to their unique circumstances.
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Mexico: Economics and the Arms Trade
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
On June 26, the small Mexican town of Apaseo el Alto, in Guanajuato state, was the scene of a deadly firefight between members of Los Zetas and federal and local security forces. The engagement began when a joint patrol of Mexican soldiers and police officers responded to a report of heavily armed men at a suspected drug safe house. When the patrol arrived, a 20-minute firefight erupted between the security forces and gunmen in the house as well as several suspects in two vehicles who threw fragmentation grenades as they tried to escape.
When the shooting ended, 12 gunmen lay dead, 12 had been taken into custody and several soldiers and police officers had been wounded. At least half of the detained suspects admitted to being members of Los Zetas, a highly trained Mexican cartel group known for its use of military weapons and tactics.
When authorities examined the safe house they discovered a mass grave that contained the remains of an undetermined number of people (perhaps 14 or 15) who are believed to have been executed and then burned beyond recognition by Los Zetas. The house also contained a large cache of weapons, including assault rifles and fragmentation grenades. Such military ordnance is frequently used by Los Zetas and the enforcers who work for their rival cartels.
STRATFOR has been closely following the cartel violence in Mexico for several years now, and the events that transpired in Apaseo el Alto are by no means unique. It is not uncommon for the Mexican authorities to engage in large firefights with cartel groups, encounter mass graves or recover large caches of arms. However, the recovery of the weapons in Apaseo el Alto does provide an opportunity to once again focus on the dynamics of Mexico’s arms trade.
White, Black and Shades of Gray
Before we get down into the weeds of Mexico’s arms trade, let’s do something a little different and first take a brief look at how arms trafficking works on a regional and global scale. Doing so will help illustrate how arms trafficking in Mexico fits into these broader patterns.
When analysts examine arms sales they look at three general categories: the white arms market, the gray arms market and the black arms market. The white arms market is the legal, aboveboard transfer of weapons in accordance with the national laws of the parties involved and international treaties or restrictions. The parties in a white arms deal will file the proper paperwork, including end-user certificates, noting what is being sold, who is selling it and to whom it is being sold. There is an understanding that the receiving party does not intend to transfer the weapons to a third party. So, for example, if the Mexican army wants to buy assault rifles from German arms maker Heckler & Koch, it places the order with the company and fills out all the required paperwork, including forms for obtaining permission for the sale from the German government.
Now, the white arms market can be deceived and manipulated, and when this happens, we get the gray market — literally, white arms that are shifted into the hands of someone other than the purported recipient. One of the classic ways to do this is to either falsify an end-user certificate, or bribe an official in a third country to sign an end-user certificate but then allow a shipment of arms to pass through a country en route to a third location. This type of transaction is frequently used in cases where there are international arms embargoes against a particular country (like Liberia) or where it is illegal to sell arms to a militant group (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). One example of this would be Ukrainian small arms that, on paper, were supposed to go to Cote d’Ivoire but were really transferred in violation of U.N. arms embargoes to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Another example of this would be the government of Peru purchasing thousands of surplus East German assault rifles from Jordan on the white arms market, ostensibly for the Peruvian military, only to have those rifles slip into the gray arms world and be dropped at airstrips in the jungles of Colombia for use by the FARC.
At the far end of the spectrum is the black arms market where the guns are contraband from the get-go and all the business is conducted under the table. There are no end-user certificates and the weapons are smuggled covertly. Examples of this would be the smuggling of arms from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Afghanistan into Europe through places like Kosovo and Slovenia, or the smuggling of arms into South America from Asia, the FSU and Middle East by Hezbollah and criminal gangs in the Tri-Border Region.
Nation-states will often use the gray and black arms markets in order to deniably support allies, undermine opponents or otherwise pursue their national interests. This was clearly revealed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s, but Iran-Contra only scratched the surface of the arms smuggling that occurred during the Cold War. Untold tons of military ordnance were delivered by the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba to their respective allies in Latin America during the Cold War.
This quantity of materiel shipped into Latin America during the Cold War brings up another very important point pertaining to weapons. Unlike drugs, which are consumable goods, firearms are durable goods. This means that they can be useful for decades and are frequently shipped from conflict zone to conflict zone. East German MPiKMS and MPiKM assault rifles are still floating around the world’s arms markets years after the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist. In fact, visiting an arms bazaar in a place like Yemen is like visiting an arms museum. One can encounter century-old, still-functional Lee-Enfield and Springfield rifles in a rack next to a modern U.S. M4 rifle or German HK93, and those next to brand-new Chinese Type 56 and 81 assault rifles.
There is often a correlation between arms and drug smuggling. In many instances, the same routes used to smuggle drugs are also used to smuggle arms. In some instances, like the smuggling routes from Central Asia to Europe, the flow of guns and drugs goes in the same direction, and they are both sold in Western Europe for cash. In the case of Latin American cocaine, the drugs tend to flow in one direction (toward the United States and Europe) while guns from U.S. and Russian organized-crime groups flow in the other direction, and often these guns are used as whole or partial payment for the drugs.
Illegal drugs are not the only thing traded for guns. During the Cold War, a robust arms-for-sugar trade transpired between the Cubans and Vietnamese. As a result, Marxist groups all over Latin America were furnished with U.S. materiel either captured or left behind when the Americans withdrew from Vietnam. LAW rockets traced to U.S. military stocks sent to Vietnam were used in several attacks by Latin American Marxist groups. These Vietnam War-vintage weapons still crop up with some frequency in Mexico, Colombia and other parts of the region. Cold War-era weapons furnished to the likes of the Contras, Sandinistas, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity movement in the 1980s are also frequently encountered in the region.
After the civil wars ended in places like El Salvador and Guatemala, the governments and the international community attempted to institute arms buy-back programs, but those programs were not very successful and most of the guns turned in were very old — the better arms were cached by groups or kept by individuals. Some of these guns have dribbled back into the black arms market, and Central and South America are still awash in Cold War weapons.
But Cold War shipments are not the only reason that Latin America is flooded with guns. In addition to the indigenous arms industries in countries like Brazil and Argentina, Venezuela has purchased hundreds of thousands of AK assault rifles in recent years to replace its aging FN-FAL rifles and has even purchased the equipment to open a factory to produce AK-103 rifles under license inside Venezuela. The Colombian government has accused the Venezuelans of arming the FARC, and evidence obtained by the Colombians during raids on FARC camps and provided to the public appears to support those assertions.
More than 90 Percent?
For several years now, Mexican officials have been making public statements that more than 90 percent of the arms used by criminals in Mexico come from the United States. That number was echoed last month in a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico.
According to the report, some 30,000 firearms were seized from criminals by Mexican officials in 2008. Out of these 30,000 firearms, information pertaining to 7,200 of them, (24 percent) was submitted to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF, and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from the United States.
This means that the 87 percent figure comes from the number of weapons submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by the Mexicans or even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. The 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in 2008 and less than 48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for tracing.
In a response to the GAO report, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wrote a letter to the GAO (published as an appendix to the report) calling the GAO’s use of the 87 percent statistic “misleading.” The DHS further noted, “Numerous problems with the data collection and sample population render this assertion as unreliable.”
Trying to get a reliable idea about where the drug cartels are getting their weapons can be difficult because the statistics on firearms seized in Mexico are very confusing. For example, while the GAO report says that 30,000 guns were seized in 2008 alone, the Mexican Prosecutor General’s office has reported that between Dec. 1, 2005, and Jan. 22, 2009, Mexican authorities seized 31,512 weapons from the cartels.
Furthermore, it is not prudent to rely exclusively on weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing as a representative sample of the overall Mexican arms market. This is because there are some classes of weapons, such as RPG-7s and South Korean hand grenades, which make very little sense for the Mexicans to pass to the ATF for tracing since they obviously are not from the United States. The ATF is limited in its ability to trace weapons that did not pass through the United States, though there are offices at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency that maintain extensive international arms-trafficking databases.
Mexican authorities are also unlikely to ask the ATF to trace weapons that can be tracked through the Mexican government’s own databases such as the one maintained by the Mexican Defense Department’s Arms and Ammunition Marketing Division (UCAM), which is the only outlet through which Mexican citizens can legally buy guns. If they can trace a gun through UCAM there is simply no need to submit it to ATF.
The United States has criticized Mexico for decades over its inability to stop the flow of narcotics into U.S. territory, and for the past several years Mexico has responded by blaming the guns coming from the United States for its inability to stop the drug trafficking. In this context, there is a lot of incentive for the Mexicans to politicize and play up the issue of guns coming from the United States, and north of the border there are U.S. gun-control advocates who have a vested interest in adding fuel to the fire and gun-rights advocates who have an interest in playing down the number.
Clearly, the issue of U.S. guns being sent south of the border is a serious one, but STRATFOR does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that 90 percent (or more) of the cartels’ weaponry comes from the United States. The data at present is inclusive — the 90 percent figure appears to be a subsample of a sample, so that number cannot be applied with confidence to the entire country. Indeed, the percentage of U.S. arms appears to be far lower than 90 percent in specific classes of arms such as fully automatic assault rifles, machine guns, rifle grenades, fragmentation grenades and RPG-7s. Even items such as the handful of U.S.-manufactured LAW rockets encountered in Mexico have come from third countries and not directly from the United States.
However, while the 90 percent figure appears to be unsubstantiated by documentable evidence, this fact does not necessarily prove that the converse is true, even if it may be a logical conclusion. The bottom line is that, until there is a comprehensive, scientific study conducted on the arms seized by the Mexican authorities, much will be left to conjecture, and it will be very difficult to determine exactly how many of the cartels’ weapons have come from the United States, and to map out precisely how the black, white and gray arms markets have interacted to bring weapons to Mexico and Mexican cartels.
More research needs to be done on both sides of the border in order to understand this important issue.
Four Trends
In spite of the historical ambiguity, there are four trends that are likely to shape the future flow of arms into Mexico. The first of these is militarization. Since 2006 there has been a steady trend toward the use of heavy military ordnance by the cartels. This process was begun in earnest when the Gulf Cartel first recruited Los Zetas, but in order to counter Los Zetas, all the other cartels have had to recruit and train hard-core enforcer units and outfit them with similar weaponry. Prior to 2007, attacks involving fragmentation hand grenades, 40 mm grenades and RPGs were somewhat rare and immediately attracted a lot of attention. Such incidents are now quite common, and it is not unusual to see firefights like the June 26 incident in Apaseo el Alto in which dozens of grenades are employed.
Another trend in recent years has been the steady movement of Mexican cartels south into Central and South America. As noted above, the region is awash in guns, and the growing presence of Mexican cartel members puts them in contact with people who have access to Cold War weapons, international arms merchants doing business with groups like the FARC and corrupt officials who can obtain weapons from military sources in the region. We have already seen seizures of weapons coming into Mexico from the south. One notable seizure occurred in March 2009, when Guatemalan authorities raided a training camp in northern Guatemala near the Mexican border that they claim belonged to Los Zetas. In the raid they recovered 563 40 mm grenades and 11 M60 machine guns that had been stolen from the Guatemalan military and sold to Los Zetas.
The third trend is the current firearm and ammunition market in the United States. Since the election of Barack Obama, arms sales have gone through the roof due to fears (so far unfounded) that the Obama administration and the Democratic Congress will attempt to restrict or ban certain weapons. Additionally, ammunition companies are busy filling military orders for the U.S. war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. As anyone who has attempted to buy an assault rifle (or even a brick of .22 cartridges) will tell you, it is no longer cheap or easy to buy guns and ammunition. In fact, due to this surge in demand, it is downright difficult to locate many types of assault rifles and certain calibers of ammunition, though a lucky buyer might be able to find a basic stripped-down AR-15 for $850 to $1,100, or a semiautomatic AK-47 for $650 to $850. Of course, such a gun purchased in the United States and smuggled into Mexico will be sold to the cartels at a hefty premium above the purchase price.
By way of comparison, in places where weapons are abundant, such as Yemen, a surplus fully automatic assault rifle can be purchased for under $100 on the white arms market and for about the same price on the black arms market. This difference in price provides a powerful economic incentive to buy low elsewhere and sell high in Mexico, as does the inability to get certain classes of weapons such as RPGs and fragmentation grenades in the United States. Indeed, we have seen reports of international arms merchants from places like Israel and Belgium selling weapons to the cartels and bringing that ordnance into Mexico through routes other than over the U.S. border. Additionally, in South America, a number of arms smugglers, including Hezbollah and Russian organized-crime groups, have made a considerable amount of money supplying arms to groups in the region like the FARC.
The fourth trend is the increasing effort by the U.S. government to stanch the flow of weapons from the United States into Mexico. A recent increase in the number of ATF special agents and inspectors pursuing gun dealers who knowingly sell to the cartels or straw-purchase buyers who obtain guns from honest dealers is going to increase the chances of such individuals being caught. This stepped-up enforcement will have an impact as the risk of being caught illegally buying or smuggling guns begins to outweigh the profit that can be made by selling guns to the cartels. We believe that these two factors — supply problems and enforcement — will work together to help reduce the flow of U.S. guns to Mexico.
While there has been a long and well-documented history of arms smuggling across the U.S.-Mexican border, it is important to recognize that, while the United States is a significant source of certain classes of weapons, it is by no means the only source of illegal weapons in Mexico. As STRATFOR has previously noted, even if it were possible to hermetically seal the U.S.-Mexican border, the Mexican cartels would still be able to obtain weapons from non-U.S. sources (just as drugs would continue to flow into the United States). The law of supply and demand will ensure that the Mexican cartels will get their ordnance, but it is highly likely that an increasing percentage of that supply will begin to come from outside the United States via the gray and black arms markets.
Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.stratfor.com. Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
On June 26, the small Mexican town of Apaseo el Alto, in Guanajuato state, was the scene of a deadly firefight between members of Los Zetas and federal and local security forces. The engagement began when a joint patrol of Mexican soldiers and police officers responded to a report of heavily armed men at a suspected drug safe house. When the patrol arrived, a 20-minute firefight erupted between the security forces and gunmen in the house as well as several suspects in two vehicles who threw fragmentation grenades as they tried to escape.
When the shooting ended, 12 gunmen lay dead, 12 had been taken into custody and several soldiers and police officers had been wounded. At least half of the detained suspects admitted to being members of Los Zetas, a highly trained Mexican cartel group known for its use of military weapons and tactics.
When authorities examined the safe house they discovered a mass grave that contained the remains of an undetermined number of people (perhaps 14 or 15) who are believed to have been executed and then burned beyond recognition by Los Zetas. The house also contained a large cache of weapons, including assault rifles and fragmentation grenades. Such military ordnance is frequently used by Los Zetas and the enforcers who work for their rival cartels.
STRATFOR has been closely following the cartel violence in Mexico for several years now, and the events that transpired in Apaseo el Alto are by no means unique. It is not uncommon for the Mexican authorities to engage in large firefights with cartel groups, encounter mass graves or recover large caches of arms. However, the recovery of the weapons in Apaseo el Alto does provide an opportunity to once again focus on the dynamics of Mexico’s arms trade.
White, Black and Shades of Gray
Before we get down into the weeds of Mexico’s arms trade, let’s do something a little different and first take a brief look at how arms trafficking works on a regional and global scale. Doing so will help illustrate how arms trafficking in Mexico fits into these broader patterns.
When analysts examine arms sales they look at three general categories: the white arms market, the gray arms market and the black arms market. The white arms market is the legal, aboveboard transfer of weapons in accordance with the national laws of the parties involved and international treaties or restrictions. The parties in a white arms deal will file the proper paperwork, including end-user certificates, noting what is being sold, who is selling it and to whom it is being sold. There is an understanding that the receiving party does not intend to transfer the weapons to a third party. So, for example, if the Mexican army wants to buy assault rifles from German arms maker Heckler & Koch, it places the order with the company and fills out all the required paperwork, including forms for obtaining permission for the sale from the German government.
Now, the white arms market can be deceived and manipulated, and when this happens, we get the gray market — literally, white arms that are shifted into the hands of someone other than the purported recipient. One of the classic ways to do this is to either falsify an end-user certificate, or bribe an official in a third country to sign an end-user certificate but then allow a shipment of arms to pass through a country en route to a third location. This type of transaction is frequently used in cases where there are international arms embargoes against a particular country (like Liberia) or where it is illegal to sell arms to a militant group (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). One example of this would be Ukrainian small arms that, on paper, were supposed to go to Cote d’Ivoire but were really transferred in violation of U.N. arms embargoes to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Another example of this would be the government of Peru purchasing thousands of surplus East German assault rifles from Jordan on the white arms market, ostensibly for the Peruvian military, only to have those rifles slip into the gray arms world and be dropped at airstrips in the jungles of Colombia for use by the FARC.
At the far end of the spectrum is the black arms market where the guns are contraband from the get-go and all the business is conducted under the table. There are no end-user certificates and the weapons are smuggled covertly. Examples of this would be the smuggling of arms from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Afghanistan into Europe through places like Kosovo and Slovenia, or the smuggling of arms into South America from Asia, the FSU and Middle East by Hezbollah and criminal gangs in the Tri-Border Region.
Nation-states will often use the gray and black arms markets in order to deniably support allies, undermine opponents or otherwise pursue their national interests. This was clearly revealed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s, but Iran-Contra only scratched the surface of the arms smuggling that occurred during the Cold War. Untold tons of military ordnance were delivered by the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba to their respective allies in Latin America during the Cold War.
This quantity of materiel shipped into Latin America during the Cold War brings up another very important point pertaining to weapons. Unlike drugs, which are consumable goods, firearms are durable goods. This means that they can be useful for decades and are frequently shipped from conflict zone to conflict zone. East German MPiKMS and MPiKM assault rifles are still floating around the world’s arms markets years after the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist. In fact, visiting an arms bazaar in a place like Yemen is like visiting an arms museum. One can encounter century-old, still-functional Lee-Enfield and Springfield rifles in a rack next to a modern U.S. M4 rifle or German HK93, and those next to brand-new Chinese Type 56 and 81 assault rifles.
There is often a correlation between arms and drug smuggling. In many instances, the same routes used to smuggle drugs are also used to smuggle arms. In some instances, like the smuggling routes from Central Asia to Europe, the flow of guns and drugs goes in the same direction, and they are both sold in Western Europe for cash. In the case of Latin American cocaine, the drugs tend to flow in one direction (toward the United States and Europe) while guns from U.S. and Russian organized-crime groups flow in the other direction, and often these guns are used as whole or partial payment for the drugs.
Illegal drugs are not the only thing traded for guns. During the Cold War, a robust arms-for-sugar trade transpired between the Cubans and Vietnamese. As a result, Marxist groups all over Latin America were furnished with U.S. materiel either captured or left behind when the Americans withdrew from Vietnam. LAW rockets traced to U.S. military stocks sent to Vietnam were used in several attacks by Latin American Marxist groups. These Vietnam War-vintage weapons still crop up with some frequency in Mexico, Colombia and other parts of the region. Cold War-era weapons furnished to the likes of the Contras, Sandinistas, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity movement in the 1980s are also frequently encountered in the region.
After the civil wars ended in places like El Salvador and Guatemala, the governments and the international community attempted to institute arms buy-back programs, but those programs were not very successful and most of the guns turned in were very old — the better arms were cached by groups or kept by individuals. Some of these guns have dribbled back into the black arms market, and Central and South America are still awash in Cold War weapons.
But Cold War shipments are not the only reason that Latin America is flooded with guns. In addition to the indigenous arms industries in countries like Brazil and Argentina, Venezuela has purchased hundreds of thousands of AK assault rifles in recent years to replace its aging FN-FAL rifles and has even purchased the equipment to open a factory to produce AK-103 rifles under license inside Venezuela. The Colombian government has accused the Venezuelans of arming the FARC, and evidence obtained by the Colombians during raids on FARC camps and provided to the public appears to support those assertions.
More than 90 Percent?
For several years now, Mexican officials have been making public statements that more than 90 percent of the arms used by criminals in Mexico come from the United States. That number was echoed last month in a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico.
According to the report, some 30,000 firearms were seized from criminals by Mexican officials in 2008. Out of these 30,000 firearms, information pertaining to 7,200 of them, (24 percent) was submitted to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF, and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from the United States.
This means that the 87 percent figure comes from the number of weapons submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by the Mexicans or even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. The 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in 2008 and less than 48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for tracing.
In a response to the GAO report, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wrote a letter to the GAO (published as an appendix to the report) calling the GAO’s use of the 87 percent statistic “misleading.” The DHS further noted, “Numerous problems with the data collection and sample population render this assertion as unreliable.”
Trying to get a reliable idea about where the drug cartels are getting their weapons can be difficult because the statistics on firearms seized in Mexico are very confusing. For example, while the GAO report says that 30,000 guns were seized in 2008 alone, the Mexican Prosecutor General’s office has reported that between Dec. 1, 2005, and Jan. 22, 2009, Mexican authorities seized 31,512 weapons from the cartels.
Furthermore, it is not prudent to rely exclusively on weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing as a representative sample of the overall Mexican arms market. This is because there are some classes of weapons, such as RPG-7s and South Korean hand grenades, which make very little sense for the Mexicans to pass to the ATF for tracing since they obviously are not from the United States. The ATF is limited in its ability to trace weapons that did not pass through the United States, though there are offices at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency that maintain extensive international arms-trafficking databases.
Mexican authorities are also unlikely to ask the ATF to trace weapons that can be tracked through the Mexican government’s own databases such as the one maintained by the Mexican Defense Department’s Arms and Ammunition Marketing Division (UCAM), which is the only outlet through which Mexican citizens can legally buy guns. If they can trace a gun through UCAM there is simply no need to submit it to ATF.
The United States has criticized Mexico for decades over its inability to stop the flow of narcotics into U.S. territory, and for the past several years Mexico has responded by blaming the guns coming from the United States for its inability to stop the drug trafficking. In this context, there is a lot of incentive for the Mexicans to politicize and play up the issue of guns coming from the United States, and north of the border there are U.S. gun-control advocates who have a vested interest in adding fuel to the fire and gun-rights advocates who have an interest in playing down the number.
Clearly, the issue of U.S. guns being sent south of the border is a serious one, but STRATFOR does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that 90 percent (or more) of the cartels’ weaponry comes from the United States. The data at present is inclusive — the 90 percent figure appears to be a subsample of a sample, so that number cannot be applied with confidence to the entire country. Indeed, the percentage of U.S. arms appears to be far lower than 90 percent in specific classes of arms such as fully automatic assault rifles, machine guns, rifle grenades, fragmentation grenades and RPG-7s. Even items such as the handful of U.S.-manufactured LAW rockets encountered in Mexico have come from third countries and not directly from the United States.
However, while the 90 percent figure appears to be unsubstantiated by documentable evidence, this fact does not necessarily prove that the converse is true, even if it may be a logical conclusion. The bottom line is that, until there is a comprehensive, scientific study conducted on the arms seized by the Mexican authorities, much will be left to conjecture, and it will be very difficult to determine exactly how many of the cartels’ weapons have come from the United States, and to map out precisely how the black, white and gray arms markets have interacted to bring weapons to Mexico and Mexican cartels.
More research needs to be done on both sides of the border in order to understand this important issue.
Four Trends
In spite of the historical ambiguity, there are four trends that are likely to shape the future flow of arms into Mexico. The first of these is militarization. Since 2006 there has been a steady trend toward the use of heavy military ordnance by the cartels. This process was begun in earnest when the Gulf Cartel first recruited Los Zetas, but in order to counter Los Zetas, all the other cartels have had to recruit and train hard-core enforcer units and outfit them with similar weaponry. Prior to 2007, attacks involving fragmentation hand grenades, 40 mm grenades and RPGs were somewhat rare and immediately attracted a lot of attention. Such incidents are now quite common, and it is not unusual to see firefights like the June 26 incident in Apaseo el Alto in which dozens of grenades are employed.
Another trend in recent years has been the steady movement of Mexican cartels south into Central and South America. As noted above, the region is awash in guns, and the growing presence of Mexican cartel members puts them in contact with people who have access to Cold War weapons, international arms merchants doing business with groups like the FARC and corrupt officials who can obtain weapons from military sources in the region. We have already seen seizures of weapons coming into Mexico from the south. One notable seizure occurred in March 2009, when Guatemalan authorities raided a training camp in northern Guatemala near the Mexican border that they claim belonged to Los Zetas. In the raid they recovered 563 40 mm grenades and 11 M60 machine guns that had been stolen from the Guatemalan military and sold to Los Zetas.
The third trend is the current firearm and ammunition market in the United States. Since the election of Barack Obama, arms sales have gone through the roof due to fears (so far unfounded) that the Obama administration and the Democratic Congress will attempt to restrict or ban certain weapons. Additionally, ammunition companies are busy filling military orders for the U.S. war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. As anyone who has attempted to buy an assault rifle (or even a brick of .22 cartridges) will tell you, it is no longer cheap or easy to buy guns and ammunition. In fact, due to this surge in demand, it is downright difficult to locate many types of assault rifles and certain calibers of ammunition, though a lucky buyer might be able to find a basic stripped-down AR-15 for $850 to $1,100, or a semiautomatic AK-47 for $650 to $850. Of course, such a gun purchased in the United States and smuggled into Mexico will be sold to the cartels at a hefty premium above the purchase price.
By way of comparison, in places where weapons are abundant, such as Yemen, a surplus fully automatic assault rifle can be purchased for under $100 on the white arms market and for about the same price on the black arms market. This difference in price provides a powerful economic incentive to buy low elsewhere and sell high in Mexico, as does the inability to get certain classes of weapons such as RPGs and fragmentation grenades in the United States. Indeed, we have seen reports of international arms merchants from places like Israel and Belgium selling weapons to the cartels and bringing that ordnance into Mexico through routes other than over the U.S. border. Additionally, in South America, a number of arms smugglers, including Hezbollah and Russian organized-crime groups, have made a considerable amount of money supplying arms to groups in the region like the FARC.
The fourth trend is the increasing effort by the U.S. government to stanch the flow of weapons from the United States into Mexico. A recent increase in the number of ATF special agents and inspectors pursuing gun dealers who knowingly sell to the cartels or straw-purchase buyers who obtain guns from honest dealers is going to increase the chances of such individuals being caught. This stepped-up enforcement will have an impact as the risk of being caught illegally buying or smuggling guns begins to outweigh the profit that can be made by selling guns to the cartels. We believe that these two factors — supply problems and enforcement — will work together to help reduce the flow of U.S. guns to Mexico.
While there has been a long and well-documented history of arms smuggling across the U.S.-Mexican border, it is important to recognize that, while the United States is a significant source of certain classes of weapons, it is by no means the only source of illegal weapons in Mexico. As STRATFOR has previously noted, even if it were possible to hermetically seal the U.S.-Mexican border, the Mexican cartels would still be able to obtain weapons from non-U.S. sources (just as drugs would continue to flow into the United States). The law of supply and demand will ensure that the Mexican cartels will get their ordnance, but it is highly likely that an increasing percentage of that supply will begin to come from outside the United States via the gray and black arms markets.
Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. www.stratfor.com. Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
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